Adam H. Morse (![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small} adamhmorse) wrote,@ 2004-01-28 22:51:00 |
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Frew v. Hawkins
Frew v. Hawkins, 02-628. Opinion by Justice Kennedy for a unanimous Court.
The profoundly antidemocratic principle of sovereign immunity generally prevents individuals from suing states in federal court. The Rehnquist Court has expanded the scope of the principle, which is often discussed in terms of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the "textualist" justices admit that the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not even come close to supporting some of the more extreme sovereign immunity decisions they have nonetheless issued. This case addressed whether sovereign immunity would be extended even further, prohibiting courts from enforcing consent decrees issued in valid court proceedings. The district court in Texas concluded that it did not, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed and through out the lawsuit in an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve a circuit split and reversed the court of appeals.
The Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court. He began by describing the procedural history, including a description of the structure of the Medicaid program. Medicaid is a cooperative state-federal program to provide medical care for the poor. States are not required to participate, but if they agree to participate and accept the concomitant federal funding, they must obey a variety of laws. Among other requirements, participating states must have an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which is a program designed to provide children with treatment that will prevent long-term health issues. This case was brought by the mothers of children eligible for EPSDT benefits. The case began in 1993 with a civil suit against various Texas state officials in their official capacities and against several state agencies. The lawsuit alleged a variety of failings of Texas's EPSDT program, including failure to provide proper screenings to eligible children and failure to provide notice of their rights. The district court dismissed the state agencies from the lawsuit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but the case proceeded against the officials. The district court certified a class of plaintiffs, the million children in Texas entitled to EPSDT benefits. In 1996, the case settled when the parties agreed to a consent decree, which the district court approved.
The current case is about enforcement of the consent decree, which is a detailed 80 page document setting out many specific duties of the state. Justice Kennedy gave an example of how the requirements of the consent decree are more specific and extensive than the general language of the federal Medicaid law it enforces.
In 1998, the petitioners filed a motion asking the district court to enforce the consent decree, alleging that the state was not carrying out its terms. The state officials argued that they had been complying and that in any event the Eleventh Amendment barred enforcement of the consent decree. The district court disagreed and issued an opinion finding that the officials had violated the decree and requesting the parties to submit possible remedy plans. At this point, the state officials took an interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that only violations of the underlying statute were actionable because of the Eleventh Amendment.
Justice Kennedy then laid out the arguments by the petitioners to structure the rest of his discussion. The petitioners argued that the state waived the Eleventh Amendment arguments when it consented to the settlement. They also argued that even without waiver, the decree would be enforceable under the principles of Ex Parte Young. The Supreme Court only considered the latter argument, because it held that the petitioners were correct and there was thus no need to consider the waiver argument.
Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign immunity of the states, giving the states themselves immunity against lawsuits from individuals. At the same time, Ex Parte Young held that federal law can be enforced against the states by bringing injunctive actions, although not actions for money damages or other retrospective relief, against state officials.
The Court's opinion then discussed the basic principles of consent decrees, which have aspects that are like each of court orders and contracts. Federal consent decrees must effectuate federal interests. In order to be enforceable, a federal consent decree must resolve a dispute within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, come within the general scope of the complaint, and serve the purposes of the underlying federal law.
Justice Kennedy then considered the intersection between the Eleventh Amendment and the rules governing consent decrees. He noted that the state, or technically its officials, did not argue that the consent decree violated either Ex Parte Young or the principles governing consent decrees. Essentially, the state officials argued that although the decree was valid, federal courts cannot enforce it because of the Eleventh Amendment.
The officials argued that Ex Parte Young is a narrow exception, and that permitting the enforcement of consent decrees would expand it to cover everything that state officials agree to in a settlement. To avoid enforcing decrees that go beyond federal law, the state officials argued, the Eleventh Amendment should bar suits to enforce consent decrees.
Justice Kennedy rejected the state officials' arguments. The petitioners sought enforcement of a valid consent decree that was entered to enforce a claim under federal law. While the Supreme Court previously ruled in Pennhurst that federal courts cannot enforce state law against state governments, Justice Kennedy distinguished Pennhurst because that case did not implicate the supremacy of federal law. While the state could have adopted a variety of different plans consistent with the Medicaid law, the consent decree required the state to comply with a specific, valid plan to enforce the statute's more general requirements. This case was more analogous to a prior case where a court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in enforcing a prior judgment against state officials that were not making a good faith effort to comply. While plaintiffs ordinarily can not get money damages against states under the Eleventh Amendment, a fine to enforce an already issued injunction is permissible, partially because it's less intrusive on state sovereignty than sending state officials to jail to compel compliance. Similarly, once a consent decree has been validly issued, courts can enforce it.
Justice Kennedy turned in the last part of his opinion to the argument that this rule could undermine sovereignty and accountability. While acknowledging that this argument has some force, he rejected the Eleventh Amendment as the mechanism to safeguard those interests in the context of consent decrees. Instead, courts should be ready to exercise their equitable authority to modify decrees in light of changed circumstances. Under appropriate circumstances, courts should be ready to terminate consent decrees, when a state shows that a decree is no longer necessary. However, when the consent decree has not been dissolved, the courts should enforce it according to its terms.
Analysis
The Court's conclusion was completely correct. However, if the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment correctly, the question would not have ever arisen. The Eleventh Amendment and notions of sovereign immunity are profoundly antidemocratic, based on antiquated notions that "the king can do no wrong." The Eleventh Amendment was a mistake that should have never been passed. However, the text of the Eleventh Amendment is very limited. The real problems come from expanding it to provide immunity against suits brought under the federal courts federal question jurisdiction, as opposed to suits brought under diversity jurisdiction. The text of the Eleventh Amendment does not reach that far, and the Supreme Court should not have expanded it to do so. As it is, the Eleventh Amendment gives license to states to flout validly enacted, constitutional federal laws under a variety of circumstances, despite the Constitution's decree that acts of Congress are supreme over state law. So the Supreme Court ought to repudiate the whole sorry line of cases extending notions of sovereign immunity to federal question cases. But at least the Supreme Court did not extend the line of cases to the silly extreme that the Fifth Circuit did.
Frew v. Hawkins, 02-628. Opinion by Justice Kennedy for a unanimous Court.
The profoundly antidemocratic principle of sovereign immunity generally prevents individuals from suing states in federal court. The Rehnquist Court has expanded the scope of the principle, which is often discussed in terms of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the "textualist" justices admit that the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not even come close to supporting some of the more extreme sovereign immunity decisions they have nonetheless issued. This case addressed whether sovereign immunity would be extended even further, prohibiting courts from enforcing consent decrees issued in valid court proceedings. The district court in Texas concluded that it did not, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed and through out the lawsuit in an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve a circuit split and reversed the court of appeals.
The Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote for a unanimous Court. He began by describing the procedural history, including a description of the structure of the Medicaid program. Medicaid is a cooperative state-federal program to provide medical care for the poor. States are not required to participate, but if they agree to participate and accept the concomitant federal funding, they must obey a variety of laws. Among other requirements, participating states must have an Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which is a program designed to provide children with treatment that will prevent long-term health issues. This case was brought by the mothers of children eligible for EPSDT benefits. The case began in 1993 with a civil suit against various Texas state officials in their official capacities and against several state agencies. The lawsuit alleged a variety of failings of Texas's EPSDT program, including failure to provide proper screenings to eligible children and failure to provide notice of their rights. The district court dismissed the state agencies from the lawsuit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but the case proceeded against the officials. The district court certified a class of plaintiffs, the million children in Texas entitled to EPSDT benefits. In 1996, the case settled when the parties agreed to a consent decree, which the district court approved.
The current case is about enforcement of the consent decree, which is a detailed 80 page document setting out many specific duties of the state. Justice Kennedy gave an example of how the requirements of the consent decree are more specific and extensive than the general language of the federal Medicaid law it enforces.
In 1998, the petitioners filed a motion asking the district court to enforce the consent decree, alleging that the state was not carrying out its terms. The state officials argued that they had been complying and that in any event the Eleventh Amendment barred enforcement of the consent decree. The district court disagreed and issued an opinion finding that the officials had violated the decree and requesting the parties to submit possible remedy plans. At this point, the state officials took an interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that only violations of the underlying statute were actionable because of the Eleventh Amendment.
Justice Kennedy then laid out the arguments by the petitioners to structure the rest of his discussion. The petitioners argued that the state waived the Eleventh Amendment arguments when it consented to the settlement. They also argued that even without waiver, the decree would be enforceable under the principles of Ex Parte Young. The Supreme Court only considered the latter argument, because it held that the petitioners were correct and there was thus no need to consider the waiver argument.
Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Eleventh Amendment confirms the sovereign immunity of the states, giving the states themselves immunity against lawsuits from individuals. At the same time, Ex Parte Young held that federal law can be enforced against the states by bringing injunctive actions, although not actions for money damages or other retrospective relief, against state officials.
The Court's opinion then discussed the basic principles of consent decrees, which have aspects that are like each of court orders and contracts. Federal consent decrees must effectuate federal interests. In order to be enforceable, a federal consent decree must resolve a dispute within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, come within the general scope of the complaint, and serve the purposes of the underlying federal law.
Justice Kennedy then considered the intersection between the Eleventh Amendment and the rules governing consent decrees. He noted that the state, or technically its officials, did not argue that the consent decree violated either Ex Parte Young or the principles governing consent decrees. Essentially, the state officials argued that although the decree was valid, federal courts cannot enforce it because of the Eleventh Amendment.
The officials argued that Ex Parte Young is a narrow exception, and that permitting the enforcement of consent decrees would expand it to cover everything that state officials agree to in a settlement. To avoid enforcing decrees that go beyond federal law, the state officials argued, the Eleventh Amendment should bar suits to enforce consent decrees.
Justice Kennedy rejected the state officials' arguments. The petitioners sought enforcement of a valid consent decree that was entered to enforce a claim under federal law. While the Supreme Court previously ruled in Pennhurst that federal courts cannot enforce state law against state governments, Justice Kennedy distinguished Pennhurst because that case did not implicate the supremacy of federal law. While the state could have adopted a variety of different plans consistent with the Medicaid law, the consent decree required the state to comply with a specific, valid plan to enforce the statute's more general requirements. This case was more analogous to a prior case where a court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in enforcing a prior judgment against state officials that were not making a good faith effort to comply. While plaintiffs ordinarily can not get money damages against states under the Eleventh Amendment, a fine to enforce an already issued injunction is permissible, partially because it's less intrusive on state sovereignty than sending state officials to jail to compel compliance. Similarly, once a consent decree has been validly issued, courts can enforce it.
Justice Kennedy turned in the last part of his opinion to the argument that this rule could undermine sovereignty and accountability. While acknowledging that this argument has some force, he rejected the Eleventh Amendment as the mechanism to safeguard those interests in the context of consent decrees. Instead, courts should be ready to exercise their equitable authority to modify decrees in light of changed circumstances. Under appropriate circumstances, courts should be ready to terminate consent decrees, when a state shows that a decree is no longer necessary. However, when the consent decree has not been dissolved, the courts should enforce it according to its terms.
Analysis
The Court's conclusion was completely correct. However, if the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment correctly, the question would not have ever arisen. The Eleventh Amendment and notions of sovereign immunity are profoundly antidemocratic, based on antiquated notions that "the king can do no wrong." The Eleventh Amendment was a mistake that should have never been passed. However, the text of the Eleventh Amendment is very limited. The real problems come from expanding it to provide immunity against suits brought under the federal courts federal question jurisdiction, as opposed to suits brought under diversity jurisdiction. The text of the Eleventh Amendment does not reach that far, and the Supreme Court should not have expanded it to do so. As it is, the Eleventh Amendment gives license to states to flout validly enacted, constitutional federal laws under a variety of circumstances, despite the Constitution's decree that acts of Congress are supreme over state law. So the Supreme Court ought to repudiate the whole sorry line of cases extending notions of sovereign immunity to federal question cases. But at least the Supreme Court did not extend the line of cases to the silly extreme that the Fifth Circuit did.
